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The experts comment: New START expires, bringing both risks and opportunities
Congressional Press Conference
Senator Markey leads with comments on the treaty.
https://www.youtube.com/live/QV2atU4aDVs
Runtime 39:49
The experts comment: New START expires, bringing both risks and opportunities
By François Diaz-Maurin | February 4, 2026
...
Despite its economy being on a war footing, Moscow would have difficulty keeping up with Washington should an arms race unfold, particularly if the United States ramps up production of delivery systems and long-range missile defenses. Russia was also particularly attached to New START because its nonstrategic weapons, which it heavily relies on, are not limited by the treaty. (US Intelligence estimates Russia possesses between 1,000 and 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads, although their exact number is uncertain. These weapons are not counted as deployed, but are stored relatively close to their launchers, making them deployable on short notice.)
Another reason Moscow was attached to New START: It provided Russia the status of peer competitor to the United States. But the end of New START marks—or better said, acknowledges—the end of a world dominated by a two-peer competition. Much has changed since the first nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed in 1991: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have acquired nuclear weapons, and China’s nuclear arsenal has grown significantly and is on a path to match in capability those of Russia and the United States.
If the end of New START brings risks and uncertainty, it also represents an opportunity for arms control to redefine itself and adapt to a multipolar world, perhaps by shifting from quantitative to capability limitations and by inviting more nuclear powers to engage in arms control discussions.
To help make sense of the international security implications of a world without New START, the Bulletin invited leading nuclear policy experts and former US diplomats to share their views. The commentaries below show a shared concern about the future of arms control. They also provide a wide range of ways by which nuclear powers can work toward strategic stability and risk reduction, post-New START.
...
(Expert commentary follows at the link.)
https://thebulletin.org/2026/02/the-experts-comment-new-start-expires-bringing-both-risks-and-opportunities/
By François Diaz-Maurin | February 4, 2026
...
Despite its economy being on a war footing, Moscow would have difficulty keeping up with Washington should an arms race unfold, particularly if the United States ramps up production of delivery systems and long-range missile defenses. Russia was also particularly attached to New START because its nonstrategic weapons, which it heavily relies on, are not limited by the treaty. (US Intelligence estimates Russia possesses between 1,000 and 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads, although their exact number is uncertain. These weapons are not counted as deployed, but are stored relatively close to their launchers, making them deployable on short notice.)
Another reason Moscow was attached to New START: It provided Russia the status of peer competitor to the United States. But the end of New START marks—or better said, acknowledges—the end of a world dominated by a two-peer competition. Much has changed since the first nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed in 1991: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have acquired nuclear weapons, and China’s nuclear arsenal has grown significantly and is on a path to match in capability those of Russia and the United States.
If the end of New START brings risks and uncertainty, it also represents an opportunity for arms control to redefine itself and adapt to a multipolar world, perhaps by shifting from quantitative to capability limitations and by inviting more nuclear powers to engage in arms control discussions.
To help make sense of the international security implications of a world without New START, the Bulletin invited leading nuclear policy experts and former US diplomats to share their views. The commentaries below show a shared concern about the future of arms control. They also provide a wide range of ways by which nuclear powers can work toward strategic stability and risk reduction, post-New START.
...
(Expert commentary follows at the link.)
https://thebulletin.org/2026/02/the-experts-comment-new-start-expires-bringing-both-risks-and-opportunities/
